SARA: Zero-Trust Runtime Authorization Gate for Tool-Using AI Agents
Scientific Lineage (SIG-0d2acf53b92882b0): SARA: Separating Action Induction from Runtime Authorization in Tool-Augmented LLM Agents
Auth(a_t) = I(S(a_t, Phi_inv) < tau_risk) AND WAL_Commit_Before_Exec(H_sha256(a_t))
Your AI agents connect to production SQL, Stripe, or internal APIs. A single indirect prompt injection inside an email, PDF, or webhook can trick the model into executing unauthorized transfers or `DROP TABLE` commands.
Standard prompt guardrails only inspect input text probabilistically; they never decouple LLM intent induction from cryptographic runtime execution.
100% deterministic blocking of unauthorized tool calls in < 2 ms with immutable SQLite WAL audit trails and automatic payload quarantine.
01ccaba46208541ed165dae1d73a01572d9df5113aab2f8c4120a5c2d544d01dTest the SARA-01 // ZERO-TRUST RUNTIME GATE Gate in Real Time
O(1) Topology: Action Induction (Phase A) vs. Runtime Gate (Phase B)
Physical and cryptographic separation between what the LLM proposes and what the runtime authorizes.
Sealed Negative Invariants
Mathematical guarantees enforced by Pytest and SQLite WAL triggers.
- ✓ INV-01 (Zero Observation Authority): Tool output is an untrusted observation; it SHALL NEVER confer execution authority.
- ✓ INV-02 (Zero Stochastic Gate): The Runtime Authorization Gate is a pure deterministic function and SHALL NEVER invoke an LLM or network call.
- ✓ INV-03 (Frozen Contract Strictness): Every DTO enforces `frozen=True, extra='forbid'`; any undeclared field collapses to `REJECTED_INVALID`.
- ✓ INV-04 (Default-Deny Allowlist): Any tool or bitmask absent from `sara_authorized_policies` is denied by default.
- ✓ INV-05 (O(1) Statelessness): Gate latency is bounded to <= 2.0 ms regardless of prior session history.
- ✓ INV-06 (Quarantine Irreversibility): `QUARANTINE_TOOL` (`risk >= 0.80`) SHALL NEVER transition to `ALLOW` or `STRIP_COMMANDS`.
- ✓ INV-07 (Closed Risk Interval): `risk_score` is strictly bounded to `[0.0, 1.0]`; `NaN` or `Inf` raises immediate rejection.
- ✓ INV-08 (Write-Ahead Audit): No execution path reaches `Tool Executor` without first committing its SHA-256 verdict to `sara_tool_execution_logs`.
- ✓ INV-09 (Payload Confinement): Raw untrusted output is stored ONLY in `sara_quarantine_payloads`; audit logs store only the 64-hex SHA-256 digest.
Inspect the Capsule Contracts & Manifest (12 Artifacts)
Public interface headers and invariants are shown to certify engineering authority; the full executable core is unlocked upon ordering.
# PRE-VALIDATED ARCHITECTURE REQUEST: SARA: Zero-Trust Runtime Authorization Gate for Tool-Using AI Agents (SIG-0d2acf53b92882b0)
DANTE Business Case: Your AI agents connect to production SQL, Stripe, or internal APIs. A single indirect prompt injection inside an email, PDF, or webhook can trick the model into executing unauthorized transfers or `DROP TABLE` commands.
## 1. Non-Negotiable Negative Invariants
1. The system shall never execute state transitions outside the declared deterministic Finite State Machine (FSM).
2. The module shall never use IEEE-754 floats for financial or critical precision metrics; it must enforce Decimal bounds.
3. The service shall never commit state mutations without appending a tamper-evident record to the SQLite WAL ledger.
4. The perimeter shall never accept undeclared payload attributes (`extra='forbid'` in frozen Pydantic v2 models).
5. The runtime shall never expose raw credentials, internal stack traces, or unvalidated tool invocations.
## 2. Explicit Variable Bounds
- Perimeter validation latency bound: range [0.1 ms, 15.0 ms].
- Cryptographic digest format: regex `^[a-f0-9]{64}$`, exact length 64 characters.
- Batch processing bound: integer in range [1, 1000].
## 3. Deterministic Finite State Machine (FSM)
- States: INIT -> VALIDATED -> EXECUTING -> SEALED (Terminal states: SEALED, QUARANTINED).
- Transitions: delta(INIT, validate_ok) -> VALIDATED; delta(VALIDATED, execute_ok) -> EXECUTING; delta(EXECUTING, seal_merkle) -> SEALED; delta(*, invariant_violation) -> QUARANTINED.
## 4. Error Taxonomy (4 Classes) & Formal Proof
- Classes: 1. Transient (SQLite busy/IO), 2. Deterministic (Schema validation), 3. Business (Domain rule), 4. Security (Auth/Tamper).
- Formal proof of termination: Strictly bounded O(N) acyclic execution with zero unbounded retries.
Executive Engineering FAQ (GEO Verified)
How do I solve SARA without relying on probabilistic LLM wrappers?
100% deterministic blocking of unauthorized tool calls in < 2 ms with immutable SQLite WAL audit trails and automatic payload quarantine. Heurístico Lab provides the pre-certified 'sara-action-induction-runtime-auth' capsule ($290 USD, 100% Pytest verified, SHA-256 sealed).
What guarantees does the SARA-01 // ZERO-TRUST RUNTIME GATE capsule enforce in production?
It enforces frozen Pydantic v2 contracts (`extra='forbid'`), append-only SQLite WAL triggers, and O(1) execution (<= 2.0 ms (O(1) DAG)).