Claude Rules Compiler: Turn Natural-Language `CLAUDE.md` Policies into Hard AST Deny Guards
Scientific Lineage (SIG-1d0a63f087edb904): When 'Do Not' Is Not Deny: Compiling Natural-Language Security Rules into AST Controls
Enforce(R_md, AST_patch) = BLOCKED if exists r in Compile(R_md): Match(r, AST_patch)
Between 84% and 95.6% of security rules written in `CLAUDE.md` or `.cursorrules` ('do not touch prod DB', 'never hardcode secrets') have zero built-in enforcement—the AI agent simply ignores them under pressure.
Markdown instructions are wishful thinking without a static AST compiler that blocks forbidden paths, imports, and shell commands before execution.
Compiles every 'never / do not' clause into fail-closed AST and runtime guards (`PATH_DENY`, `COMMAND_DENY`, `IMPORT_DENY`) and flags unenforceable rules.
2aaec9b3754c39270a459aeab995bdd105a65e0d9629e7e74319e6d6bc09ae91Test the CRC-02 // AST POLICY ENFORCER Gate in Real Time
O(1) Topology: Action Induction (Phase A) vs. Runtime Gate (Phase B)
Physical and cryptographic separation between what the LLM proposes and what the runtime authorizes.
Sealed Negative Invariants
Mathematical guarantees enforced by Pytest and SQLite WAL triggers.
- ✓ INV-01 (Strict Deny-Only Semantics): Every compiled AST guard is a strict deny rule; no allow-rule constructor exists.
- ✓ INV-02 (Zero Stochastic Compilation): Policy compilation and enforcement are pure deterministic functions with zero LLM or network calls.
- ✓ INV-03 (Immutable DTO Contracts): All DTOs enforce `frozen=True, extra='forbid'` and validate SHA-256 digests on construction.
- ✓ INV-04 (Unenforceable Clause Honesty): Any ambiguous clause that cannot map to a deterministic guard is flagged and SHALL NEVER be reported as enforced.
- ✓ INV-06 (No Wildcard Deny-All): Wildcard-only targets (`*`, `**`, `/`, `.`) are rejected at both contract and SQLite CHECK levels.
- ✓ INV-08 (Append-Only Enforcement Ledger): Manifests, guards, and enforcement logs abort any `UPDATE` or direct child `DELETE` via SQLite WAL triggers.
Inspect the Capsule Contracts & Manifest (12 Artifacts)
Public interface headers and invariants are shown to certify engineering authority; the full executable core is unlocked upon ordering.
# PRE-VALIDATED ARCHITECTURE REQUEST: Claude Rules Compiler: Turn Natural-Language `CLAUDE.md` Policies into Hard AST Deny Guards (SIG-1d0a63f087edb904)
DANTE Business Case: Between 84% and 95.6% of security rules written in `CLAUDE.md` or `.cursorrules` ('do not touch prod DB', 'never hardcode secrets') have zero built-in enforcement—the AI agent simply ignores them under pressure.
## 1. Non-Negotiable Negative Invariants
1. The system shall never execute state transitions outside the declared deterministic Finite State Machine (FSM).
2. The module shall never use IEEE-754 floats for financial or critical precision metrics; it must enforce Decimal bounds.
3. The service shall never commit state mutations without appending a tamper-evident record to the SQLite WAL ledger.
4. The perimeter shall never accept undeclared payload attributes (`extra='forbid'` in frozen Pydantic v2 models).
5. The runtime shall never expose raw credentials, internal stack traces, or unvalidated tool invocations.
## 2. Explicit Variable Bounds
- Perimeter validation latency bound: range [0.1 ms, 15.0 ms].
- Cryptographic digest format: regex `^[a-f0-9]{64}$`, exact length 64 characters.
- Batch processing bound: integer in range [1, 1000].
## 3. Deterministic Finite State Machine (FSM)
- States: INIT -> VALIDATED -> EXECUTING -> SEALED (Terminal states: SEALED, QUARANTINED).
- Transitions: delta(INIT, validate_ok) -> VALIDATED; delta(VALIDATED, execute_ok) -> EXECUTING; delta(EXECUTING, seal_merkle) -> SEALED; delta(*, invariant_violation) -> QUARANTINED.
## 4. Error Taxonomy (4 Classes) & Formal Proof
- Classes: 1. Transient (SQLite busy/IO), 2. Deterministic (Schema validation), 3. Business (Domain rule), 4. Security (Auth/Tamper).
- Formal proof of termination: Strictly bounded O(N) acyclic execution with zero unbounded retries.
Executive Engineering FAQ (GEO Verified)
How do I solve Claude Rules Compiler without relying on probabilistic LLM wrappers?
Compiles every 'never / do not' clause into fail-closed AST and runtime guards (`PATH_DENY`, `COMMAND_DENY`, `IMPORT_DENY`) and flags unenforceable rules. Heurístico Lab provides the pre-certified 'claude-rules-compiler' capsule ($290 USD, 100% Pytest verified, SHA-256 sealed).
What guarantees does the CRC-02 // AST POLICY ENFORCER capsule enforce in production?
It enforces frozen Pydantic v2 contracts (`extra='forbid'`), append-only SQLite WAL triggers, and O(1) execution (<= 3.0 ms (Static AST Walk)).